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In the paper today, I want to consider issues of methodological innovation in communication, 
media and cultural studies, that arise out of the extent to which we now live in a media 
environment characterised by an digital media abundance, the convergence of media 
platforms, content and services, and the globalisation of media content through ubiquitous 
computing and high-speed broadband networks. These developments have also entailed a 
shift in the producer-consumer relationships that characterised the 20
th
 century mass 
communications paradigm, with the rapid proliferation of user-created content, accelerated 
innovation, the growing empowerment of media users themselves, and the blurring of 
distinctions between public and private, as well as age-based distinctions in terms of what 
media can be accessed by whom and for what purpose.  
I note the provocations that have been made by the previous speakers, Stuart Cunningham 
and Jean Burgess. From Stuart‘s paper, I want to pick up on the concepts of macro-meso-
micro that he made use of, and consider the extent to which the institutional design of media 
regulations may be the missing ―meso‖ element in media and cultural research, that can 
animate what might otherwise be all too familiar debates between those who draw attention 
to individual agency on the one hand, and those who focus structural constraint on the other. 
Such a concept would seem to be particularly relevant to discussions of media policy in an 
age of globalisation, as what is apparent is that the nation-state has not disappeared from view 
– the simplistic account of a scalar shift from the national to the global that critical 
geographers and others have rightly criticised – but that what it does in an age of media 
convergence, digitisation and content abundance is varying considerably from the regime of 
the protective or regulatory state that was the default setting of 20
th
 century media and 
cultural policy.  
I want to pick up from Jean‘s paper the question of what it means to research the digital 
domain, and to undertake research that makes use of digital technologies, in an era where we 
have gone beyond what David Berry refers to as ‗Digital Humanities 1.0‘, or the application 
of computers to media and cultural research (Berry, 2011). A review of the Australian media 
classification scheme in 2011 clearly must incorporate a digital dimension. If we compare the 
current context to that when the last comprehensive review of censorship and classification 
was undertaken, which was by the Australian Law Reform commission in 1991 (ALRC, 
1991), the most striking feature of the 20 years since is the rise of the Internet, and with it the 
digitisation of everything (or at least everything that is media). As I will elaborate upon, the 
sheer volume of submissions that we have received – 2,452 submissions in response to the 
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Issues Paper released in May 2011 – have also forced the ALRC to ‗go digital‘ in its methods 
of evaluating the data. While the computational turn‘ at the ALRC is what Berry would 
describe as a 2.0 approach rather than a 3.0 one, as we are working with the 3 million words 
of digital data we received rather than challenging the ontological standing of media content 
regulations as such, we are engaged in significant methodological innovation for a Law 
Reform Commission, anchored as we are in the conventions of word and text.  
While emphasising what is new in the field, I also need to note the relationship of the media 
classification review to that which is more longstanding, and that is debates about media and 
cultural policy. A recent paper by Graeme Turner, published in the journal Cultural Studies, 
provides a lapsarian account of cultural policy studies in Australia, arguing that an earlier 
commitment to the ‗public good‘ had been overtaken in the 2000s by agendas such as 
creative industries and convergence culture, which he understands to be largely ideological in 
their nature and lacking in theoretical rigour. Turner presents a similar trajectory to that found 
in works on media and cultural policy by Hesmondhalgh (2007), Freedman (2008) and Miller 
(2009): that commitments to pluralism, regulation, national culture and the public interest 
have been overtaken by a narrow economism and corporate globalism characteristic of the 
dominant ideology of our times, that of neoliberal globalisation.  To quote Turner: 
The move from cultural policy studies to creative industries is, among other things, a 
move from the nation-state – the location of regulatory and developmental interests in 
the culture industries – to the global market, the desired location of commercialisable 
convergent enterprises. The beneficiary of the earlier project is the nation, the citizen 
and, typically, the state-subsidized cultural organization. The beneficiary of the later 
project is the entrepreneur, the commercial industry and, possibly, the consumer. The 
move from cultural policy studies to creative industries is also, most definitively, a 
retreat from a commitment to the public good and its replacement by a belief in the 
social utility of a market outcome, reflecting the classic neo-liberal view that 
commercial success or ‗wealth creation‘ for the enterprises concerned in itself 
constitutes a public good. Where the former was directly engaged with developing its 
potential as a social, political, cultural and theoretical project, the latter is primarily 
focused upon economic and market-development objectives as themselves enablers of 
other kinds of social progress (Turner, 2011: 693). 
 
This extended quote from Turner draws out, in a particularly clear fashion, the antimonies 
that have framed the debate between a once vibrant and pluralist public sphere as it pertained 
to media and cultural policy, and the current policy landscape, which is seen by Turner, and 
many critical humanities scholars, as one of a doctrinaire neo-liberalism that has turned away 
from citizenship principles and the nation-state, and towards marketisation and economic 
globalization. The antimonies that Turner presents are mapped out below: 
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Media and cultural policy pre-neo-
liberalism 
Media and cultural policy post-neo-
liberalism 
Nation-states Global markets 
State-subsidized cultural organizations Commercial convergent enterprises 
Policy as servicing citizen interests Policy as serving industry interests 
Commitment to the public good Commitment to ‗wealth creation‘ 
Multi-disciplinary socio-cultural projects Primary focus on economics and market 
development objectives 
Cultural policy studies Creative industries 
 
As is often the case with accounts that present a glorious past and counter it to a more 
problematic present, there are some historical lapses in this binary. If we were to go back to 
the cultural policy debates of 20 years ago, we would find that many of their advocates – 
some of whom are indeed here today – were accused of pursuing a reformist program that 
could only serve, as Simon During (2010) has recently described it, to strengthen the system 
of democratic state capitalism even when it was successful in achieving public interest goals. 
Moreover, it is notable that the main media policy outcome of that period in Australia, the 
Broadcasting Services Act 1992, was itself widely criticised at the time as a neo-liberal 
document promoting marketisation and a negation of public interest regulatory principles. So 
I would suggest that we need to be careful about proclaiming a past ―golden age‖ from which 
we can engage in a critique of the present. 
What I want to do in today‘s presentation is to proceed in three stages. First, I want to draw 
out some of the ways in which digital data is being used by the ALRC is the current review of 
the National Classification Scheme, to indicate that such methods are not exclusively the 
domain of Internet studies and convergence culture, but are entering into traditionally book-
bound fields such as law reform. Second, I want to consider recent debates in Australian 
public policy from within the bureaucracy itself, that map out a terrain of thinking about 
policy problems that is considerably more complex than the caricatured binaries of regulation 
and the public good versus neo-liberalism and marketisation that often frame our conceptions 
of the process from the outside (as the above account demonstrates). Finally, I will consider 
how the digital problematic itself cuts across these binaries, and the challenges that this 
presents for those engaged in media policy processes, who may see themselves not as 
wearing the dark cloak of neo-liberal functionaries, but as well intentioned media reformers 
motivated by the public good. While my own focus is on media content regulation generally, 
and media classification more particularly, such issues arise in other current policy debates, 
most notably the Convergence Review being conducted through the Department of 
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Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy (DBCDE), but also the National 
Cultural Policy process occurring through the Office of the Arts in the Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet.  
Making Sense of Submissions: The ALRC and Digital Data 
On 24 March 2011, the Attorney-General of Australia, the Hon Robert McClelland MP, 
asked the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) to inquire into and report on the 
framework for the classification of media content in Australia. In the terms of reference 
provided to the ALRC for the National Classification Scheme Review, the Attorney-General 
indicated that he had regard to the following matters when giving the ALRC this inquiry: 
 the rapid pace of technological change in media available to, and consumed by, the 
Australian community; 
 the needs of the community in this evolving technological environment; 
 the need to improve classification information available to the community and 
enhance public understanding of the content that is regulated; 
 the desirability of a strong content and distribution industry in Australia, and 
minimising the regulatory burden on industry;  
 the impact of media on children and the increased exposure of children to a wider 
variety of media including television, music and advertising as well as films and 
computer games; 
 the size of the industries that generate potentially classifiable content and potential 
for growth; and 
 a statutory review of Schedule 7 of the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth) and 
other sections relevant to the classification of content. 
In undertaking such a review, the ALRC was asked to consider:  
 relevant existing Commonwealth, State and Territory laws and practices; 
 classification schemes in other jurisdictions; 
 the classification categories contained in the Classification (Publications, Films and 
Computer Games) Act 1995 (Cth), National Classification Code and Classification 
Guidelines; 
 any relevant constitutional issues, and 
 any other related matter. 
The ALRC National Classification Scheme Review occurs in the context of wider debates 
about the policy and regulatory frameworks that will apply to the media and communications 
landscape in Australia. Most notably, it is occurring in parallel with the Convergence Review 
being conducted for the Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital 
Economy (DBCDE), and both reviews are expected to be completed in the first quarter of 
2012. Of particular relevance are the principles outlined by the Convergence Review, which 
has stated that the policy objectives suitable for a converging media environment include 
that: 
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 communications and media services that are available to Australians should reflect 
community standards and the views and expectations of the Australian public; and 
 Australians should have access to the broadest range of content across platforms and 
services as possible. 
The ALRC‘s inquiry also follows the Attorney-General‘s Department‘s public consultation 
on an R 18+ classification for computer games conducted during 2010, and we note the 
agreement of the state and territory censorship ministers to the introduction of an 
―R18+‖classification for computer games reached at the Standing Committee of Attorney-
Generals‘ (SCAG) meeting in Adelaide in July 2011.  The Review will also be considering, 
among other things, examine the current scope of the existing Refused Classification (RC) 
category and whether it reflects the content that should be prohibited online. 
The ALRC conducted the last review of censorship and classification in Australia in 1991. In 
the 20 years since, some questions remain similar to those of the time, and some have 
changed dramatically. The major changes in the classification landscape arise from the 
internet and digital media technologies. It is now estimated that 72% of Australian 
households have broadband internet connections, as compared to 30% in 2005, and that this 
number will increase to almost 90% of homes by 2014. Moreover, it is estimated that there 
will be 3.5 million mobile internet subscribers by 2014 (PwC, 2010). These dramatic shifts in 
how people are accessing media content in Australia, and the associated changes to industry 
structures and business models, point to the need for a revised policy and regulatory 
framework for media and communications in Australia. The current National Classification 
Scheme Review is very much informed by these shifts. 
Under the Australian Law Reform Commission Act 1996 (Cth), the ALRC ‗may inform itself 
in any way it thinks fit‘ for the purposes of reviewing or considering anything that is the 
subject of an inquiry.
1
 In performing its function, it is specified that the ALRC must aim at 
ensuring that the laws, proposals and recommendations it reviews, considers or makes: 
(a)    do not trespass unduly on personal rights and liberties or make the rights and liberties of citizens 
unduly dependent on administrative, rather than judicial, decisions; and 
(b)    are, as far as practicable, consistent with Australia‘s international obligations that are relevant to the 
matter.  
Under s 24(2) of its Act, when formulating recommendations, the ALRC must have regard to 
the effect that the recommendations may have on: 
(a)   the costs of getting access to, and dispensing, justice; and 
(b)   persons and businesses who would be affected by the recommendations (including the economic effect, 
for example). 
Three principles that generally inform ALRC inquiries are: the need to ground 
recommendations in an evidence base; extensive community consultation; and the ability to 
draw upon the ALRC‘s status as an independent statutory agency to bring together expert 
opinion on the subject matter of the review. Acknowledging that widespread community 
consultation is a hallmark of best practice law reform, the ALRC is expected to ‗make efforts 
                                                          
1 Australian Law Reform Commission Act 1996 (Cth) s 38. 
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to ensure that the consultation process remains an open process‘ (Barnett, 2011: 161), and to 
make use of both formal and informal information-gathering processes, as well as the use of 
digital technologies to better facilitate public input in its processes, and to build upon its 
reputation for community trust, rigorous inquiry, and statutory independence from 
government.  
 
Leximancer maps of responses 
Wicked Problems, Smarter Policy and Broken Concepts: Contemporary 
Australian Public Policy Concepts 
 
 
One way of thinking about reforming the national classification scheme is as an example of 
what public policy analysts term a wicked problem. First developed by urban planners Rittel 
and Webber (1973), the term was used to identify problems arising in American cities that 
were proving to be intractable to planners and policy makers. A wicked problem is one where 
the challenge is as much to define the problem as to resolve it, and Rittel and Webber 
observed that this was far more likely to be the case with social problems than technical ones. 
In contrast to the optimism of planning theory as it had been evolving in the policy sciences 
in the 1950s and 1960, Rittel and Webber observed that ‗the problems that planners must deal 
with are wicked and incorrigible ones, for they defy attempts to delineate their boundaries 
and to identify their causes … The planner who works with open systems is caught up in the 
ambiguity of their causal webs‘ (Rittel and Webber, 1973: 167). 
 
In the current context, the Australian Public Service Commission (2007) has identified 
examples of wicked problems as including the question of climate change, rising levels of 
obesity, Indigenous disadvantage, and land degradation. Features of wicked problems are: 
 
1. Difficulties in defining the problem, and divergent views among stakeholders as to the 
nature of the problem; 
2. The existence of interdependencies, multiple causes and internally conflicting goals 
contributing to the difficulties in defining the problem;  
3. The possibility of attempts to address wicked problems leading to unforeseen 
consequences elsewhere; 
4. The evidence base for addressing the issue shifting as policy makers are trying to 
address it, meaning that they ‗have to focus on a moving target‘ (APSC, 2007: 2); 
5. The absence of clear solutions which ‗solve‘ or ‗fix‘ the problem; 
6. The nature of the problems as being socially complex rather than simply technically 
complex. In the language of complexity theories, they are complex rather than simply 
complicated problems, as the behavior of agents engaged with the problem 
continuously adapt and evolve in the face of new information and ideas (Hartley et. 
al., 2012). As urban planners such as Rittel and Webber were observing as early as 
the late 1960s, the complexity of what Bruno Latour has now termed sociotechnical 
systems (Latour, 2007) renders such problems more difficult to address simply 
through more complex or multi-causal planning models; 
2
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 An issue which particularly concerned Rittel and Webber was the increasingly socially and culturally diverse 
nature of American cities, which they saw as making it more difficult to reach consensus about end-goals, as 
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7. Responsibility for addressing the problems rarely sits within one organization, or even 
within a single level of government; 
8. Addressing wicked problems often involves changing the behavior and/or gaining the 
commitment of individual citizens. In the terms used by Thaler and Sunstein (2008), it 
may entail ‗nudging‘ individuals towards behavioural change, as the traditional 
armoury of policy instruments used to influence citizen behavior – legislation, taxes, 
fines, other sanctions – have proved to be insufficient.  
9. Finally, wicked problems are often not new problems, but rather ones where there 
have been repeated policy failures. The case of Indigenous disadvantage is a case in 
Australia where the persistence of problems has not been for a lack of policy action, 
yet that policy action has failed to redress longstanding problems. 
 
Several implications follow from identifying a problem as being wicked. An obvious 
implication is the need to develop policy strategies that work across departments and levels of 
government, to break down institutional silos and entrenched habits of thought. Moreover, it 
can require defining a problem differently and identifying and engaging relevant stakeholders 
in new ways. The work of Sofoulis (2005) on ‗Everyday Water‘ provides a case study in how 
cultural researchers could address questions concerning Sydney‘s water consumption in new 
ways, by focusing on the less analysed question of how people use water in their everyday 
lives, as distinct from the more common systems thinking of ‗Big Water‘, or the community 
of water suppliers and experts who address such questions in terms of how to provide more 
water to growing suburban populations.  
 
The Australian Public Service Commission advises that what it describes as collaborative 
strategies are most appropriate for addressing wicked problems that ‗have many stakeholders 
amongst whom power is dispersed … [and] where part of the solution … involves sustained 
behavioural change by many stakeholders and/or citizens‘ (APSC, 2007: 10). Such 
approaches have also been described as smarter policy, whereby policy makers are 
‗encouraged … to consider the full range of policy instruments that could be used to tackle a 
policy issue‘, and to ‗think laterally and inclusively about what groups, organisations and 
individuals might have a convergent interest in achieving particular policy goals‘ (APSC, 
2009: iii). The range of policy instruments available to policy makers are deemed to include: 
(1) direct government regulation (also termed command-and-control regulation); (2) self-
regulation, co-regulation, and quasi-regulation; (3) voluntarism by individuals and firms; (4) 
education and information instruments; and (5) economic instruments (taxes, fines, subsidies, 
property rights, soft loans etc.).  
 
See Appendix for overview of policy instruments 
 
Policy makers considering this range of policy instruments are expected to ask two prior 
questions. One is that a rigorous policy analysis requires a prior assessment that policy 
intervention would achieve net benefits for the community as a whole after taking account of 
its impacts. The identification of a social, economic or environmental problem does not 
justify government intervention in and of itself; policy makers need to demonstrate that the 
benefits of intervening outweigh the costs. The other issue to be considered is that policy 
makers do not start with a clean slate on any regulatory issue. The choice of policy 
instruments is invariably constrained, to some extent, by the existing array of government 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
well as leading to increasing questioning of the political standpoint of experts themselves in an environment of 
competing claims and perceived zero-sum outcomes (Rittel and Webber, 1973: 167-169).  
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interventions, meaning that an audit of current policy instruments already operating in the 
policy space is a prerequisite for a good policy design process. This audit would ideally 
include interventions by all levels of government and the full range of policy instruments—
both regulatory and non-regulatory – as well as international comparisons where relevant, 
and consideration of what may be working, and what can be seen to have failed.  
 
Direct government regulation – also referred to as black letter law or command-and-control 
regulation – occurs when the Government formulates and enforces legislation that specifies 
the behaviour required of organisations or individuals. It is most useful and effective when: 
the risks associated with the regulated activity are substantial; where legal certainty is 
required; where there is little cohesiveness in the regulated industry and/or a history of non-
compliance with self-regulatory industry codes; and where the key industry players are 
readily identifiable (ASPC, 2009: 4-6). The challenges faced with direct government 
regulation, which can limit its effectiveness as a form of industry regulation, are: 
 
 It requires regulators to have detailed and accurate knowledge of the industries they 
are regulating; 
 It takes significant time to draft and amend; 
 It tends towards a ―one-size-fits-all‖ approach that is less suitable to diverse or fast-
changing industries; 
 It can be costly to enforce; 
 Its effectiveness can be enforced considerably if not enforced; 
 It can generate cultures of non-compliance from those regulated, and lead to costly 
legal challenges; 
 The absence of incentives to comply can promote a culture of minimal compliance, 
thus failing to promote processes of continuous improvement and relevant cultural 
change.  
 
The Australian Public Service Commission suggests that direct government regulation is 
more likely to achieve its policy goals when it is combined with other policy instruments. In 
industries, where there are a relatively small number of firms involved and where there are 
incentives to be seen to be responsive to the public good, co-regulatory arrangements may be 
the best approach. This has been the model in existence in Australian broadcasting, where 
industry bodies develop and administer codes of practice that are backed up by government 
legislation that can provide enforcement if required. It is argued that one merit of such an 
approach is that it places the broadcasters closer to audience complaints, thereby allowing 
them to better understand and respond to public concerns about the material they put to air. 
Another example could be the combination of direct government regulation and voluntarism.  
 
The final factor to be considered here is that of broken concepts. The Australian 
Communications and Media Authority has used this term to capture how ‗the process of 
convergence has broken, or significantly strained, the legislative concepts that form the 
building blocks of current communications and media regulatory arrangements‘ (ACMA, 
2011: 5). It identified 55 concepts in current Australian broadcasting and telecommunications 
legislation that are ‗either ―broken‖ or under significant strain from the effects of 
convergence‘, in a context where: 
 
Digitalisation has broken the nexus between the shape of content and the container 
which carries it … Legacy delivery arrangements followed service-specific networks 
and devices. Technological change in the form of digital transmission systems means 
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that service delivery is now largely independent of network technologies. This can be 
conceived and depicted as a shift from the vertical, sector-specific approach to the 
horizontal, layered approach (ACMA, 2011: 6).  
 
The corollary is that ‗regulation constructed on the premise that content could (and should) be 
controlled by how it is delivered is losing its force, both in logic and in practice‘ (ACMA, 
2011: 7). An example of a ‗broken concept‘ in Australian broadcasting legislation is that of 
narrowcasting. When the BSA came into operation in 1993, it envisaged alternatives to 
traditional radio and television services, but thought of these in terms of more specialist 
channels that would nonetheless be delivered and received by conventional means, such as 
television services covering horse racing, or radio services aimed at tourists in a particular 
region.  
 
What was not envisaged was a service such as You Tube or IP TV, or the delivery of 
audiovisual content through the Internet generally. It is the case that ‗the exclusion of 
services providing programs using the internet from the definition of broadcasting service 
creates a gap that has grown in significance over time as content delivered using the internet 
has grown in availability and use,‘ (ACMA, 2011: 7) yet there would be little point in trying 
to extend the concept of narrowcasting as defined in existing legislation to these new 
services. There is a need to rethink the legislative basis around which services providing 
media content are to be regulated in a wider and more holistic manner that is not platform-
specific in its domain of application. 
 
„Broken concepts‟ in media classification 
 
In working through over 2,300 responses received to its Issues Paper, the ALRC was quickly 
able to identify that the dominant view of submitters from across the spectrum – from 
industry groups to morals campaigners, to gamers and civil libertarians – was that the time 
had come for fundamental reform of the Australian media classification scheme. While media 
convergence and associated trends (digitisation, globalisation, accelerated innovation, user 
created content etc.) provided a context for recommending root-and-branch transformation, 
the need for change existed independently of whether or not – to use Carlota Perez‘s (2010) 
term - a new techno-economic paradigm has emerged.  
 
The classification field is littered with broken concepts, ranging from the differential 
treatment of console-based computer games to games accessed from other digital platforms, 
to the confusing that exists about the illegality of X-rated material (in many parts of 
Australia, it is illegal to sell or distribute, but legal to own). The current framework is also 
fragmented at several levels, including: fragmentation of enforcement authority between the 
states, the territories and the Commonwealth; fragmentation of regulatory authority between 
the ACMA, the Classification Board and Customs; and platform-based fragmentation 
between centralized government classification of films and computer games, co-regulation in 
relation to broadcasting, and an complaints/investigations-based model applying to Internet 
content.  
 
A clear ‗broken concept‘ in terms of its ongoing applicability as a basis for classification 
legislation is the concept of the ―reasonable adult‖. The ―reasonable adult‖ concept first 
emerged in censorship law as a basis for classification, enabling the touchstone of 
―community standards‖ to set limits to the powers of the censor to ban material on the basis 
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of its ―offensiveness‖. In an era of relative media scarcity, and where media content may be 
considered to be either public in nature or generally available, as with films in cinemas, 
television programs on free-to-air channels, and magazines displayed in public places, the 
idea of basing restrictions around what may give offence to the ―reasonable adult‖ can strike 
some form of balance between those concerned with public morals and those of the view that 
adults can freely choose the media they wish to read, hear or see. The art of classification, in 
this context, involves striking the right balance between these competing societal principles. 
In one of the few attempts to actually define the reasonable adult test, the Federal Attorney-
General Daryl Williams proposed in 1997 that: 
 
The ―reasonable adult‖ test is used in two different senses – as a measure of 
community standards and also as an acknowledgment that adults have different 
personal tastes…In other words, although some reasonable adults may find the 
material offensive, and thus justify a restricted classification for it, other may not 
(quoted in Griffith, 2001: 5).  
 
In an era of media content proliferation, and where content is being accessed by individuals 
across a multiplicity of platforms, devices and services, there is the real question of whether it 
matters what other members of the community think about people‘s media choices, as long as 
they are not contrary to criminal law.  
 
The case for significantly relaxing media classification requirements is strengthened by the 
increasingly private nature of the sites of access, as high-speed broadband networks enable 
more media content to be delivered instantaneously, and the manner in which individuals 
themselves are increasingly becoming the producers and distributors as well as the ‗audience‘ 
for media. The OECD described the wider socio-cultural implications of user-created content 
in these terms:   
 
The Internet as a new creative outlet has altered the economics of information 
production, increased the democratisation of media production and led to changes in 
the nature of communication and social relationships (sometimes referred to as the 
‗rise—or return—of the amateurs‘). Changes in the way users produce, distribute, 
access and re-use information, knowledge and entertainment potentially give rise to 
increased user autonomy, increased participation and increased diversity (OECD, 
2008: 12).
  
 
The approach that the ALRC has taken around this question is an empirical one. Rather than 
relying upon the legal fiction of the ―reasonable adult‖ to base classification categories 
around, it is instead being proposed that a comprehensive review of community standards in 
Australia towards media content needs to be undertaken, combining both quantitative and 
qualitative methodologies, with broad reach across the Australian community. In order to 
obtain longitudinal data, the exercise should be undertaken at five-yearly intervals, and would 
be undertaken by an entity that was structurally independent of government. Moreover, there 
has also been work undertaken on community attitudes to ―higher-level‖ content – material 
rated R18+ and above, including some RC material – with the consultants Urbis, in order to 
gauge the extent to which material that may be violent, offensive or confronting to some 
should nonetheless be available to adults subject to some restrictions, as compared to being 
banned altogether. The aim here is to better calibrate the higher level categories to 
community expectations, and to develop a more grounded understanding of what 
11 
 
―community standards‖ may imply in a context of media convergence and content 
abundance.  
 
Verticals and Horizontals: Debating Media Policy in the Context of 
Convergence 
 
As was noted earlier, the concept of convergence generates some debate in communication, 
media and cultural studies, and this has spillovers into media policy debates. For convergence 
sceptics, such as Turner, claims made about a convergence culture are ‗about 20 per cent fact 
and 80 per cent speculative fiction‘ (Turner, 2011: 686). In a similar vein, James Curran 
(2010) finds in convergence talk much that is simply ‗millennial wish fulfilment‘. The policy 
terrain appears quite different. The responses to the ALRC‘s Issues Paper argued the need for 
fundamental reform to Australia‘s media classification system, describing the current 
framework as ‗an analogue piece of legislation in a digital world‘, and drawing attention to 
aspects of the current classification framework that have become dysfunctional, are failing to 
meet intended goals, and create confusion for the industries involved and the wider 
community.  
The view from industry in particular that the system was in need of fundamental reform was 
almost universal: it was argued that consistently piecemeal regulatory responses to changes in 
technologies, markets and consumer behaviour have created uncertainty for both consumers 
and industry, have blurred lines of responsibility for driving policy change, and have left in 
place a framework that is ill-equipped to meet the challenges of convergence. It is worth 
keeping in mind here that we are not necessarily talking about ancient legislation. The 
Classification Act came into place in 1995, and the Broadcasting Services Act in 1993. The 
view is that 20 years is now becoming the maximum use-by date for media legislation.  
So what are the challenges of convergence? The simplest way of expressing this context is 
around the concept of verticals and horizontals. This is the concept being used by the ACMA 
in its understanding of ‗broken concepts‘ (ACMA, 2011), and by the Convergence Review 
(DBCDE, 2011), as well as by Crawford and Lumby (2011). In responses to the ALRC‘s 
Issues Paper, it featured particularly strongly in the submissions from Google (2011) and 
Telstra (2011). Simply put, the argument is that 20
th
 century media structures were based 
upon discrete vertically integrated industries (print, broadcasting, telecommunications etc.), 
and 21
st
 century media is driven by converged horizontal media layers (infrastructure, 
networks, platforms/services, content).  
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Figure 1 
 
Media Convergence and industry Structures 
 
 
 
Source: ACMA, 2011: 6.  
 
The media policy debate of our times, and it will be a worldwide conversation, concerns the 
accuracy of this mapping of convergent media, and the implications for policy and regulation 
of working with such a framework. The ACMA identifies the root of many of the ‗broken 
concepts‘ it is dealing with as arising out of platform-specific regulations. The Convergence 
Review points to the concept of regulatory parity as an implication of this shift:  
A logical extension of the ‗layered‘ approach is that a policy framework can develop 
around a specific service regardless of its mode of delivery. ‗Regulatory parity‘ is 
founded on ideas of fair competition
 
and technology neutrality, which—at their 
broadest—suggest treating all content equally. The concept of regulatory parity has 
appeal for many stakeholders although stakeholders may differ on whether it is best 
achieved by deregulating services or by regulating services that currently have little or 
no regulation (DBCDE, 2011: 13).  
 
In the Classification Review, the comparable question arises around platform neutrality, or 
the need to base classifications upon content rather than platforms or means of delivery, and 
to address the implications of content from multiple platforms now being carried through 
single devices. The ALRC has taken the view that: 
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with the growing popularity of ‗smart televisions‘ and other devices that enable 
seamless access to converged media content from a single platform, there is a need to 
focus classification on the content that is to be classified, rather than the platform from 
which it is being delivered (ALRC, 2011: 66).  
A number of regulatory issues arise from a recommendation of platform neutrality, from the 
treatment of apps as compared to console-based computer games, to the future of time-based 
restrictions for commercial free-to-air television, to the question of whether industry self-
classification is the only sustainable long-term approach for ―X‖-rated material. All of these 
issues are canvassed in the ALRC‘s Discussion paper, and we are awaiting industry and 
community responses.  
Some of the criticism of the ALRC‘s process so far has been that we have not taken enough 
of a principles-based approach to the future of classification. In particular, it argued that the 
combination of the proliferation of both media content and access through the Internet and a 
more diverse and pluralistic Australian society makes the whole concept of regulating media 
content according to community standards both an anachronism and a legacy concept.  
Interestingly, this is a criticism we are more likely to get from our more ‗progressive‘ 
respondents, through forums such as Twitter and our public discussion blogs. Why I see this 
as interesting is that, in many respects, our most ‗progressive‘ interlocutors in the inquiry 
want less government regulation, more decision to be left to industry and consumers 
themselves (i.e. to the market), and argue that media convergence and globalisation have now 
proceeded to a point where concerns about community standards – what is derisorily termed 
the ―will nobody think of the children‖ argument – is seen as a throwback to an earlier, more 
conservative and paternalistic era. 
What makes this interesting, and where I return to the earlier discussion, is that it is a 
―progressive‖ response that, in many respects, sits on the right of the table I presented earlier, 
where it is cultural policy concerns and notions of the public interest that appear to be the 
more politically conservative path to be taking. It has been relevant in this regard to follow 
the process which led to the announcement of the Independent Media Inquiry, which was 
based upon a more platform-specific premise – public interest concerns about the 
concentrated nature of the Australian newspaper market. We are left with the question of 
whether one can simultaneously call for less regulation of the Internet and more regulation of 
the media. The debate about media convergence suggests that, if the shift from industry-
based vertically integrated silos to a layering of networks, platforms, devices and content has 
validity, then this will prove to be a difficult set of propositions to sustain.  
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Appendix: Policy Instruments available to regulators 
 
Policy 
Instrument 
Advantages Disadvantages Context when most 
effective 
Direct 
government 
regulation 
(„command-
and-control‟ 
regulation) 
Legal certainty 
Enforcement provisions 
are clear 
Requires detailed 
regulator knowledge 
of the industry 
Takes time to make 
and amend laws 
May be costly to 
enforce 
May promote non-
compliance or minimal 
compliance 
Activities are potentially high 
risk to the community 
Lack of industry co-ordination 
History of compliance 
problems 
Readily identifiable industry 
targets 
Self-
regulation, 
co-
regulation 
and quasi-
regulation 
(regulation 
by industry 
group or 
association) 
Greater speed and 
flexibility  
Draws upon industry 
knowledge 
Potentially more 
commitment to 
compliance 
Scope to innovate to 
raise overall behavioural 
standards 
Can be an alibi for 
non-regulation by 
government 
Industry self-interest 
may render such 
arrangements 
tokenistic 
Can be used as a 
barrier to new entrants 
to an industry 
Possible coincidence between 
company interests and public 
interest 
Strong lobbies exist to monitor 
effectiveness 
Activities are of low risk to the 
community 
Industry is relatively co-
ordinated and ‗community of 
shared fate‘ exists 
Voluntarism 
(Governmen
t co-
ordinates 
voluntary 
participatio
n) 
Internalised motivations 
for participation 
Difficult to target 
outcomes 
Willingness to 
participate may 
diminish over time 
Requires individuals and 
businesses to see their interests 
as synonymous with the public 
interest 
Can promote wider cultural and 
behavioural change in the 
community 
Education 
and 
Information 
Low administrative 
burden 
Cost effectiveness 
Works best as part of a 
package of measures, 
where information is 
important to policy 
implementation 
Will not work when 
there are tensions 
between public and 
private interests 
Strong lobby groups exist to 
‗shame‘ poor performers and 
reward good ones 
Investment in compliance is 
rewarded through willingness 
of consumers to change 
purchasing behaviour 
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Economic 
instruments 
(e.g. 
property 
rights, 
market 
creation, tax 
incentives, 
fees and 
charges, soft 
loans) 
Can influence behaviour 
without direct 
intervention into 
markets 
Provide incentives to go 
beyond minimal 
compliance 
Allows for flexibility in 
how to respond to 
regulations 
May generate 
significant costs to 
government 
May not operate 
equitably across 
different industries or 
categories of 
consumers 
Outcomes may be less 
than those for direct 
regulation 
Particular economic 
instruments will work more 
effectively indifferent 
circumstances 
 
Source: APSC, 2009.  
 
